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Abstract
We investigate expectation formation in a controlled experimental
environment. Subjects are asked to predict the price in a standard
asset pricing model. They do not have knowledge of the underlying
market equilibrium equations, but they know all past realized prices
and their own predictions. Aggregate demand of the risky asset de-
pends upon the forecasts of the participants. The realized price is
then obtained from market equilibrium with feedback from individual
expectations. Each market is populated by six subjects and a small
fraction of fundamentalist traders. Realized prices diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from fundamental values. In some groups the asset price converges
slowly to the fundamental price, in other groups there are regular os-
cillations around the fundamental price. In all groups participants
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1coordinate on a common prediction strategy. The individual predic-
tion strategies can be estimated and correspond, for a large majority
of participants, to simple linear autoregressive forecasting rules.
Keywords: experimental economics, expectations, asset pricing, co-
ordination
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1 Introduction
Expectations play an important role in economics. Decisions of economic
agents are based upon their expectations and beliefs about the future state
of the market. Through these decisions expectations feed back into the actual
realization of the economic variables. This expectations feedback mechanism
seems to be particularly important for ﬁnancial markets. For example, if
many traders expect the price of a certain asset to rise in the future, their
demand for this asset increases which, by the law of supply and demand,
will lead to an increase of the market price. This self-conﬁrming nature of
expectations is typical for speculative asset markets and it illustrates that the
“psychology of the market” may be very important. A theory of expectation
formation is therefore a crucial part of modeling economic and in particular
ﬁnancial markets.
It is hard to observe or obtain detailed information about individual ex-
pectations in real markets. One approach is to obtain data on expectations
by survey data analysis, as done for example by Turnovsky (1970) on ex-
pectations about the Consumers’ Price Index and the unemployment rate
during the post-Korean war period. Frankel and Froot (1987) use a survey
on exchange rate expectations and Shiller (1990) analyzes surveys on expec-
tations about stock market prices and real estate prices. However, since in
survey data research one can not control the underlying economic fundamen-
tals, or the information that the forecaster possesses, it is hard to measure
expectation rules in diﬀerent circumstances.
An alternative approach is to study expectation formation in an experi-
mental setting. In this paper we report the ﬁndings of a laboratory exper-
iment about expectation formation in a simple asset pricing model. In this
experiment we ask the participants to give their expectation of next period’s
price of an unspeciﬁed risky asset. Submitting predictions is the only task
for the participants. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market
equilibrium equation, but they know all past realized prices and, of course,
their own predictions. Their earnings are inversely related to the predic-
tion error they make. Given the price forecast of a participant, a computer
2program computes the associated aggregate demand for the risky asset and
subsequently the market equilibrium price. The realized price thus becomes
a function of the individual forecasts. Our experiment is designed in order
to obtain explicit information about expectations of participants in such a
controlled expectations feedback environment.
An important advantage of the experimental approach is that the exper-
imenter has control over the underlying fundamentals. In our experiment
economic fundamentals are constant over time. Participants have perfect
information about the mean dividend and the interest rate, and could use
this information to compute the, constant, fundamental price. A second
advantage of our experimental approach is that we get explicit information
about individual expectations. Since in our setup there is no trade, our data
is not disturbed by speculative trading behavior, or by changes in the un-
derlying demand and/or supply functions of the participants. Prior to the
experiment the only unknown to the experimenters is the way subjects form
expectations. Hence, our experimental approach provides us with ‘clean’
data on expectations.
Finance is currently witnessing an important shift in research emphasis,
according to some even a paradigmatic shift, from a modeling approach with
perfect, rational agents to a behavioral ﬁnance approach with “boundedly
rational” agents using simple “rule of thumb” trading strategies. The psy-
chology of investors plays a key role in behavioral ﬁnance, and diﬀerent types
of psychology based trading and behavioral modes have been identiﬁed in the
literature, such as positive feedback or momentum trading, trend extrapo-
lation, noise trading, overconﬁdence, overreaction, optimistic or pessimistic
traders, upward or downward biased traders, correlated imperfect rational
trades, overshooting, contrarian strategies, etc.. Some key references deal-
ing with various aspects of investor psychology include e.g. Cutler et al.
(1990), DeBondt and Thaler (1985), DeLong et al. (1990a, 1990b), Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998), Gervais and Odean (2001) and Hong and Stein
(1999, 2003), among others; see e.g. Shleifer (2000) and Hirshleifer (2001)
for extensive surveys and many more references on behavioral ﬁnance. In-
dividual expectations about future asset prices play a key role and are inti-
mately related to these diﬀerent behavioral modes. Our experiments may be
viewed as an attempt to classify individual forecasting rules. We will present
experimental evidence for various of these behavioral modes, in particular
for correlated imperfect rational forecasting due to trend extrapolation and
overreaction. We will also investigate how far this behavior deviates from
perfect rationality and to which extent individual forecasting strategies are
“irrational”.
Our main experimental ﬁndings are the following. Realized experimental
3asset prices diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the (constant) fundamental price. We
observe diﬀerent types of behavior. In some groups the price of the asset con-
verges (slowly) to the fundamental price and in other groups there are large
oscillations around the fundamental price. For some groups these oscillations
have a decreasing amplitude and prices seem to converge to the fundamental
price slowly; in other groups the amplitude of the oscillations is more or less
constant over the duration of the experiment or even increasing and there is
no apparent convergence.
We are particularly interested in the individual prediction strategies used
by the participants. Analysis of the predictions reveals that the dispersion
between prediction strategies is much smaller than the forecast errors par-
ticipants make on average. This indicates that participants within a group
coordinate on a common prediction strategy. Although participants make
forecasting errors, they are similar in the way that they make these errors.
Estimation of the individual prediction strategies shows that participants
tend to use simple linear prediction strategies, such as naive expectations,
adaptive expectations or ‘autoregressive’ expectations. Again, participants
within a group coordinate on using the same type of simple prediction strat-
egy. We also ﬁnd evidence for trend extrapolation and overreaction. This
behavior is consistent with momentum trading and positive short run corre-
lation in asset returns.
Surprisingly little experimental work focussing on expectation formation
has been done. Williams (1987) considers expectation formation in an exper-
imental double auction market which varies from period to period by small
shifts in the market clearing price. Participants predict the mean contract
price for 4 or 5 consecutive periods. The participant with the lowest forecast
error earns $1.00. In Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) expectations and
the occurrence of speculative bubbles are studied in an experimental asset
market. In a series of related papers, Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993)
and Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994, 1995) have studied expectation for-
mation in inﬂationary overlapping generations economies. Marimon, Spear
and Sunder (1993) ﬁnd experimental evidence for expectationally driven cy-
cles and coordination of beliefs on a sunspot 2-cycle equilibrium, but only
after agents have been exposed to exogenous shocks of a similar kind. Mari-
mon and Sunder (1995) present experimental evidence that a “simple” rule,
such as a constant growth of the money supply, can help coordinate agents’
beliefs and help stabilize the economy. Although all these papers are clearly
related to our work, they can not be viewed as pure experimental testing
of the expectations hypothesis, everything else being constant, because in
all these cases dynamic market equilibrium is aﬀected not only by expecta-
tions feedback but also by other types of human behavior, such as trading
4behavior. A number of other laboratory experiments focus on expectation
formation exclusively. Schmalensee (1976) presents subjects with historical
data on wheat prices and asks them to predict the mean wheat price for
the next 5 periods. In Dwyer et al. (1993) and Hey (1994) subjects have
to predict a time series generated by a stochastic process such as a random
walk or a simple linear ﬁrst order autoregressive process. The drawback of
the last two papers is that no economic context is given. Kelley and Fried-
man (2002) consider learning in an Orange Juice Futures price forecasting
experiment, where prices are driven by a linear stochastic process with two
exogenous variables (weather and competing supply). The main diﬀerence
with our approach is that in the last three papers expectations feedback is
ignored.
In our experiment we have explicitly accounted for this expectations feed-
back, which we believe to be very important for many economic environ-
ments, and especially for ﬁnancial markets. Finally, Gerber, Hens and Vogt
(2002) recently studied a repeated experimental beauty contest in which par-
ticipants each period place either a buy or a sell order. Prices are determined
by total market orders and noise. Although this is a positive feedback system
like in our experiment, they do not measure expectations explicitly and their
experimental environment is more stylized. Similar to our results, a high
level of coordination is found.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the ex-
periment and Section 3 discusses the underlying asset pricing model. Section
4 presents an analysis of the realized asset prices, whereas Section 5 focuses
on the individual prediction strategies. Concluding remarks are given in Sec-
tion 6. The Appendices contain some regression results and information for
the participants.
2 Experimental design
In ﬁnancial markets traders are involved in two related activities: prediction
and trade. Traders make a prediction concerning the future price of an as-
set, and given this prediction, they make a trading decision. We designed
an experiment that is exclusively aimed at investigating the way subjects
form predictions. We solicit predictions from the subjects about the price
of a certain asset for the next period. Given these predictions the computer
derives the associated individual demand for the asset and subsequently the
market clearing price (i.e. the price at which aggregate demand equals ag-
gregate supply). Each subject therefore acts as an advisor or a professional
forecaster and is paired with one trader, which may be thought of as a large
5pension fund. The subject has to make the most accurate prediction for this
trader and then the trader (i.e. the computer) decides how much to trade.
The earnings of the subjects in the experiment are inversely related to their
prediction error.
The experiment is presented to the participants as follows. The partic-
ipants are told that they are an advisor to a pension fund and that this
pension fund can invest its money in a risk free asset (a bank account) with
a risk free gross rate of return R =1+r,w h e r er is the real interest rate,
or it can decide to invest its money in shares of an inﬁnitely lived risky as-
set. The risky asset pays uncertain dividends yt in period t. Dividends yt
are IID distributed with mean y. The mean dividend y and interest rate r
are common knowledge. The task of the advisor (i.e. the participant) is to
predict the price of the risky asset. Participants know that the price of the
asset is determined by market equilibrium between demand and supply of
the asset. Although they do not know the exact underlying market equilib-
rium equation they are informed that the higher their forecast is, the larger
will be the fraction of money invested in the risky asset and the larger will
be the demand for stocks. They do not know the investment strategy of the
pension fund they are advising and the investment strategies of the other
pension funds. The participants are not explicitly informed about the fact
that the price of the asset depends on their prediction or on the prediction of
the other participants. They also do not know the number of pension funds
or the identity of the other members of the group.
The information for the participants is given in computerized instructions.
Comprehension of the instructions is checked by two control questions. At
the beginning of the experiment the participants are given two sheets of paper
with a summary of all necessary information, general information, informa-
tion about the stock market, information about the investment strategies of
the pension funds, forecasting task of the ﬁnancial advisor and information
about the earnings. The handout also contains information about the ﬁ-
nancial parameters (mean dividend and risk free rate of return) with which
an accurate prediction of the fundamental price can be made. Finally they
are given a table from which they can read, for a given forecast error, their
earnings (see Appendix D). Appendix C contains an English translation of
the information given to the participants.
In every period t in the experiment the task of the participants is to
predict the price pt+1 of the risky asset in period t +1 , given the avail-
able information. This information consist of past prices of the risky as-




h1,w h e r epe
hτ is the price participant h expects for period τ.
Subjects are told that their price forecast has to be between 0 and 100 for
6Figure 1: English translation of the computer screen as seen by the partici-
pants during the experiment. Predictions and prices have diﬀerent colors.
every period. In periods 1 and 2 no information about past prices is avail-
able. At the end of period t, when all predictions for period t +1have been
submitted, the participants are informed about the price in period t and
earnings for that period are revealed. Figure 1 shows an English translation
of the computer screen the participants are facing during the experiment.
On the screen the subjects are informed about their earnings in the previous
period, total earnings, a table of the last twenty prices and the corresponding
predictions and a time series of the prices and the predictions.
The earnings of the participants consist of a “show-up” fee of 5 Euro and
of the earnings from the experiment which depended upon their forecasting
errors. The number of points earned in period t by participant h is given by
the (truncated) quadratic scoring rule











where 1300 points is equivalent to 0.5 Euro. Notice that earnings are zero in
period t when |pt − pe
ht| ≥ 7.1
An experimental asset market consists of 6 participants and a certain
fraction of fundamentalist traders and it lasts for 51 periods. A total of
60 subjects (10 groups) participated in this experiment. Subjects (mostly
1Paying participants according to quadratic forecast error is equivalent (up to a con-
stant) with paying them according to risk-adjusted proﬁt of the traders (for details see
Hommes (2001)).
7undergraduates in economics, chemistry and psychology) were recruited by
means of announcements on information boards in university buildings, and
via e-mail. The computerized experiment was conducted in the CREED
laboratory. It lasted for approximately 1.5 hours and average earnings were
21.46 Euro.
3 The price generating mechanism
3.1 The asset pricing model
The realized prices are generated by a standard asset pricing model with
heterogeneous beliefs. For textbook treatments of this model see e.g. Cuth-
bertson (1996) or Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). Each trader can
choose between investing his money in a risk free asset with a risk free gross
rate of return R =1+r or investing his money in shares of an inﬁnitely lived
risky asset. The price of this risky asset in period t is pt.F o r e a c h s h a r e
dividends yt are paid out in period t. These dividends are assumed to be
independently and identically distributed with mean y and variance σ2
y.T h e
fundamental value (i.e. the discounted value of future dividends) of the risky






The asset market is populated by 6 pension funds and a small fraction of
fundamentalist traders, as discussed below. Each pension fund h is matched
with a participant to the experiment and makes an investment decision at
time t based upon this participant’s prediction pe
h,t+1 of the asset price. The
fundamentalist traders always predict the fundamental price pf and make
a trading decision based upon this prediction. Moreover, the fraction nt of
these fundamental traders in the market is endogenous and depends posi-
tively upon the absolute distance between the asset price and the fundamen-
tal value.2 The greater this distance the more these fundamental traders will
invest, and the other way around. These fundamentalist traders therefore
act as a ‘stabilizing force’ pushing prices in the direction of the fundamental
price. Their presence therefore excludes the possibility of speculative bub-
bles in asset prices. DeGrauwe, DeWachter and Embrechts (1993) discuss a
similar stabilizing force in an exchange rate model with fundamentalists and
chartists. In the same spirit Kyle and Xiong (2001) introduce a long-term
2This is similar to the model discussed in Brock and Hommes (1998) where the fraction
nht of trader using prediction strategy h is also endogenous. In their paper this fraction
depends positively upon past performance of the prediction strategy.
8investor that holds a risky asset in an amount proportional to the spread
between the asset price and its fundamental value.
The market clearing price is determined as follows. The amount of shares
pension fund h w a n t st oh o l di npe r i odt dependspositivelyupon theexpected
excess return pe
h,t+1 + y − Rpt. This means that an increase in the expected
price of the asset for period t +1l e a d st oa ni n c r e a s ei nd e m a n df o rt h e
asset in period t. The market clearing price in period t is then given as

















h,t+1 is the average predicted price for period t +1 .
The current period’s asset price is therefore determined by (average) beliefs
about next period’s asset price and an extra noise term εt, where the latter
corresponds to (small) stochastic demand and supply shocks. Note that the
realized price at time t is determined by the price predictions for time t+1.
Therefore, when traders have to make a prediction for the price in period
t +1they do not know the price in period t yet, and they can only use
information on prices up till time t − 1.
In the experiment the risk free rate of return, r =0 .05,a n dt h em e a n
dividend are ﬁx e ds u c ht h a tpf =6 0(with y =3 )i n7 of the groups and
pf =4 0(with y =2 )i n3 of the groups. Small demand and supply shocks





. In order to be able to compare
the diﬀerent groups in the experiment, we used the same realizations of the
demand and supply shocks for each group. Finally, the weight nt of the












which indeed increases as the price moves away from the fundamental price.
Notice that nt =0for pt−1 = pf. Moreover, given that the fundamental
value equals pf =6 0or pf =4 0 , the weight of the fundamentalist traders





≈ 0.26. The weight of the other
traders is the same for each trader and equal to (1 − nt)/6.
An important feature of the asset pricing model is its self-conﬁrming
nature: if all traders have a high (low) prediction the realized price will also
be high (low). This important feature is characteristic for a speculative asset
market: if traders expect a high price, the demand for the risky asset will be
high, and as a consequence the realized market price will be high, assuming
that the supply is ﬁxed.
93.2 Benchmark expectations rules
This subsection discusses some important benchmark expectations rules in
the asset pricing model. In Sections 4 and 5 we will discuss which of these
benchmarks gives a good description of the results from our asset pricing ex-
periments. The development of the asset price depends upon the (subjective)
expectations of the diﬀerent trader types. Under rational expectations the
subjective expectation Eht of trader type h is equal to the objective math-
ematical conditional expectation Et, for all h. Given that bubbles cannot






Therefore, under rational expectations pt corresponds to independent draw-
ings from the normal distribution with mean pf and variance (σε/R)
2 =
100/441. The upper left panel of Figure 2 shows the asset price under ra-
tional expectations for the realization of the demand and supply shocks that
was used in the experiment, when the fundamental value is given by pf =6 0 .
The rational expectations hypothesis is quite demanding. It requires
that participants know the underlying asset pricing model and use this to
compute the conditional expectation for the future price and that they do not
make structural forecast errors. In particular, rational expectations requires
knowledge about the beliefs of all other participants. It will only prevail when
participants are able to coordinate on the rational expectations equilibrium.
Let us now consider asset price behavior when participants use simple
forecasting rules instead of rational expectations. They do not have (exact)
knowledge of the underlying model, but have their own beliefs about the
development of asset prices and use this belief and the available time series
observations to predict the price. The belief of a participant is sometimes
called a perceived law of motion. Given those perceived laws of motion the
price generating model is then referred to as the implied actual law of motion.
The main objective of this paper is to get some insights into the nature of
the perceived laws of motion people actually use. When participants have to
predict a price for time t+1, they know the interest rate r (which is constant
over time), the mean dividend y, the realized prices up to time t − 1 and
their own price predictions up to time t. A general form of a participant’s














where fh can be any (possibly time-varying) function. There are no restric-
tions on the speciﬁcation fh and the possibilities are therefore unbounded.













f + y + εt
#
.
The actual dynamics of prices is to a great extent characterized by the pre-
diction strategies used by the traders. Depending on the prediction strategies
used by the agents (which may, for example, be nonlinear or discontinuous)
almost any type of price behavior can occur.
We will now brieﬂy discuss the dynamics of our asset pricing model under
a number of simple and well known expectation rules. Notice that, since
participants know the values of y and r, they have enough information to
infer the fundamental value and predict it for any period, i.e. they can give
pe
h,t+1 = pf as a forecast, for all t.
The perhaps simplest expectations scheme corresponds to static or naive




that is, the participant’s prediction for the next price corresponds to the
last observed asset price. Under the assumption that all traders have naive












It can be easily seen that in this case prices will converge to the neighborhood
of the fundamental price (see the upper right panel of Figure 2). Moreover,
in the absence of any stochastic demand and supply shocks, prices converge
monotonically to the fundamental price. This also holds true for another well
known prediction strategy, adaptive expectations, which corresponds to
p
e




ht + w(pt−1 − p
e
ht),
where 0 <w≤ 1. Hence, under adaptive expectations the prediction is
adapted in the direction of the last observed price. The weight parameter w
determines how fast predictions are updated. Notice that naive expectations
corresponds to a special case of adaptive expectations, where w =1 .
The lower left panel of Figure 2 shows realized prices when agents use the

































































Figure 2: These graphs show a computer simulation of the asset pricing
model for four benchmark expectations rules. The upper left panel shows
realized asset prices if all participants would have rational expectations and
forecast pe
h,t+1 = pf. The upper right panel shows the realized asset prices
if all participants use naive expectations pe
h,t+1 = pt−1. The lower left panel
shows the realized asset prices if all participants use the sample average
forecasting rule. The lower right panel shows the realized asset prices if all
participants use a simple AR(2) forecasting rule pe
h,t+1 =3 0+3
2pt−1 − pt−2.
In the last three panels we used as the ﬁrst two forecasts ph1 = ph2 =5 0 ,f o r
all h. The horizontal line in each of the graphs at pf = y/r =6 0denotes the
fundamental value. The realization of the noise used for the simulations is
the same one that is used in the experiment.
12In that case, equal weight is given to all past observed prices and as a result
convergence to the fundamental price is much slower than in the case of naive
expectations where all weight is given to the last observation.
We conclude this discussion on prediction strategies by looking at the
class of linear autoregressive prediction strategies with 2 lags, that is
p
e
h,t+1 = αh + βh1pt−1 + βh2pt−2. (4)
We will refer to (4) as the AR(2) prediction rule. Notice that the endogeneity
of the fraction of fundamentalist traders nt introduces a nonlinearity in the
price generating mechanism (1), even if all prediction strategies are linear.
Now assume all participants use rule (4) and let βl = 1
6
P6
h=1 βhl,f o rl =
1,2. Depending on the values of β1 and β2 one can have diﬀerent types of
dynamics. In particular, if β
2
1 +4 Rβ2 < 0 the price will oscillate around the
steady state price. In the absence of stochastic demand and supply shocks,
these oscillations will converge to the steady state if β2 > −R, but they will
converge to a limit cycle when β2 < −R. On the other hand, if β
2
1+4Rβ2 > 0,
the prices move monotonically or jump up and down, one period below the
steady state and the next period above the steady state. If |β1| + |β2| <R ,
these price movements converge to the steady state.
The AR(2) prediction strategy (4) can be rewritten as
p
e
h,t+1 = α + βpt−1 + δ (pt−1 − pt−2),
where β ≡ β1 + β2 and δ ≡− β2. Expressed in this way it provides a nice
intuition. Participants believe that the price will be determined by the last
observation (the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side) but they also try to
follow the trend i nt h ep r i c e s( e x p r e s s e di nt h et h i r dt e r m ) :i fδ>0 they
believe that an upward movement in prices will continue the next period,
whereas if δ<0 they believe an upward movement in the prices will be
(partially) oﬀset by a downward movement in prices in the next period. The
former correspond to trend extrapolators or positive feedback traders,w h e r e a s
the latter correspond to so-called contrarians.
The lower right panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution of the realized
price if everybody in the experiments uses AR(2) expectations pe
h,t+1 =3 0+
3
2pt−1 − pt−2 (where we have taken the fundamental price to be equal to 60
in both cases). For both cases we assumed that ph1 = ph2 =5 0 , for all h.
Furthermore, we used the same realization of demand and supply shocks εt
as in the experiment.
134 Aggregate behavior of asset prices
Figure 3 shows the realized asset prices in the experiment for the ten groups.
In the ﬁrst seven groups the fundamental value equals 60,w h e r e a si nt h e
last three groups the fundamental value equals 40. The horizontal line in the
graphs corresponds to the fundamental price for that group.
We can classify the diﬀerent groups in three diﬀerent categories:
i) monotonic convergence: the price in groups 2 and 5 seems to converge
monotonically to the fundamental price from below;
ii) converging oscillations: the price in groups 4, 7 and 10 oscillates around
the fundamental price but the amplitude of the oscillations decreases
over time indicating convergence to the fundamental price; and
iii) persistent oscillations: the price in groups 1, 6, 8 and 9 oscillates but
the amplitude of this oscillations seems to be constant or even increas-
ing. In these groups there does not seem to be convergence to the
fundamental price.
Group 3 is more diﬃcult to classify, it starts out with oscillations, but
from a certain period on there seems to be monotonic convergence to the
fundamental price.3
Comparing Figure 3 with Figures ?? and 2 one observes that realized
prices under the naive expectations benchmark resemble realized prices in
groups 2 and 5 of the experiment remarkably well. On the other hand,
the oscillatory behavior of the realized price in groups 1, 4, 6 − 10 in the
experiment is qualitatively similar to the asset price behavior when partici-
pants use AR(2) prediction strategies. Clearly, naive and AR(2) prediction
strategies give a qualitatively much better description of aggregate asset price
ﬂuctuations in the experiment than does the benchmark case of rational ex-
pectations. Recall from Section 3 that an AR(2) rule can be interpreted as
a trend following forecasting strategy.
Figure 4 shows the sample average and sample variance of realized prices
for the 10 groups. The ﬁgure also represents sample averages and sample
variances of three important benchmarks discussed in Section 3. They are
denoted RE (where pe
h,t+1 = pf,f o ra l lh), Naive (where pe
h,t+1 = pt−1, for all
3The sudden fall of the asset price in group 3 from 55.10 in period 40 to 46.93 in period
41 is due to the fact that one of the participants predicts 5.25 for period 42. It is likely
that this corresponds to a typing error (maybe his/her intention was to type 55.25), since
this participants’ 5 previous predictions all were between 55.00 and 55.40, giving him/her





























































Figure 3: Realized prices for the diﬀerent groups. The horizontal lines at































Figure 4: Mean and variance (on a logarithmic scale) of realized asset prices.
h and all t>1)a n dAR(2) (where pe
h,t+1 = 1
2pf + 3
2pt−1 −pt−2, for all h and
all t>2), respectively. All of these benchmarks are computed once for the
case with fundamental value pf =6 0a n do n c ef o rt h ec a s ew i t hpf =4 0 .
Inspection of Figure 4 conﬁrms our earlier conclusion: naive expectations or
AR(2) expectations gives a much better description of aggregate price be-
havior than does rational expectations. Comparing the rational expectations
benchmark with the 7 experimental groups with fundamental value pf =6 0 ,
we see that the sample average is lower and the sample variance is higher
in the experiment than under rational expectations. From this we conclude
that in this experimental asset pricing model we have i) undervaluation of
the asset; i i )e x c e s sv o l a t i l i t yof the asset prices. Moreover, sample average
and variance of the realized prices are more in line with those of naive and
AR(2) expectations. In terms of sample mean and sample variance naive
and AR(2) expectations yield much better results than rational expecta-
tions. The same holds, by and large, for the three groups with fundamental
price pf =4 0 , although the sample variance in these groups is rather large.
The undervaluation of the asset in the ﬁrst seven groups can be explained
as follows. We have restricted prices to lie between 0 and 100. Since agents
have no prior information about the price generating process, many initial
16guesses lie around 50. Most of the initial guesses will therefore be smaller
than the fundamental price of 60. In fact, the ﬁrst realized price p1 is 48.96 on
average (averaged over the seven groups), whereas the ﬁnal realized price p51
is 58.18 on average. So, the undervaluation actually (slowly) disappears as
time goes by. Also the volatility of prices decreases over time. In particular
for the groups where there is slow but steady convergence to the fundamental
price, the variance in the second subinterval approaches the variance under
rational expectations. By the same argument we have overvaluation in the
three groups with a fundamental value pf =4 0 , which lies beneath the
midpoint of the interval of admissible prices. Here we have p1 =4 4 .31 on
average (averaged over groups 8, 9 and 10)a n dp51 =4 1 .46 on average.
As a ﬁnal remark on the realized asset prices we note that the inﬂuence
of the fundamentalist traders on the asset pricing dynamics seems to be lim-
ited. For groups 4 and 10 the maximum weight of the fundamentalist trader
becomes 0.191 and 0.186, respectively, reducing the weight of an individual
participant to 0.135 and 0.136 for that period, respectively. For all other
groups the maximum weight of the fundamentalist traders is smaller than
0.115, which is, even in that period, signiﬁcantly smaller than the weight of
an individual participant.
5 Individual prediction strategies
We now turn to the individual prediction strategies of the participants in our
asset pricing experiment. In Subsection 5.1 we show that participants tend
to coordinate on a common prediction strategy. Subsection 5.2 discusses
earnings per group. Subsection 5.3 investigates whether participants use the
available information eﬃciently. In Subsection 5.4 we present results on char-
acterizing and estimating the individual prediction strategies. Subsection 5.5
presents four additional groups without fundamentalist traders.
5.1 Coordination
Figure 5 shows, for each group, the predictions of all participants. A strik-
ing feature of Figure 5 is that diﬀerent participants within one group seem
to coordinate on some common prediction strategy. This coordination of
expectations is obtained in all ten groups.

























































Figure 5: Individual predictions for each group.











which corresponds to the individual quadratic forecast error averaged over
time and over participants within a group. Note that the ﬁrst 10 observations






ht as the average prediction for period t
in a group (averaged over individuals in that group) we ﬁnd that the average

































The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (5) measures the dispersion between
individual predictions. It gives the distance between the individual predic-
tion and the average prediction pe
t within the group, averaged over time and
participants. Note that it equals 0 if and only if all participants, in one
group, use exactly the same prediction strategy. Hence, this term measures
d e v i a t i o nf r o mc o o r d i n a t i o no nac o m m o np r e d i c t i o ns t r a t e g y . T h es e c o n d
term on the right-hand side of (5) measures the average distance between
the mean prediction pe
t and the realized price pt. If individual expectations
can be described as “rational expectations with error”, where the error has
mean zero and is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with the errors of
the other participants, then we should expect that individual forecast errors
cancel each other out in the aggregate. This is consistent with Muth (1961)
who gives the following formulation of the rational expectations hypothesis
(p.316):
“The hypothesis can be rephrased a little more precisely as follows: that
expectations of ﬁrms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribu-
tion of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about
the prediction of the theory (or the “objective” probability distributions of
outcomes).”
In other words, individual expectations may be wrong, but in the aggre-
gate expectations should be approximately correct. If this is the case then
this second term should be relatively small.
19Table 1 shows, for each of the ten groups, how the average quadratic
forecast error can be broken up in these two terms.4


















1 6.38 1.28 (20%) 5.10 (80%)
2 0.77 0.19 (25%) 0.58 (75%)
3 7.58 2.86 (38%) 4.72 (62%)
4 325.77 93.21 (29%) 232.56 (71%)
5 0.55 0.11 (20%) 0.44 (80%)
6 5.15 1.24 (24%) 3.91 (76%)
7 24.76 8.52 (34%) 16.24 (66%)
8 59.78 13.31 (22%) 46.48 (78%)
9 36.11 4.31 (12%) 31.80 (88%)
10 277.65 70.85 (26%) 206.80 (74%)
Table 1: Diﬀerent measures for the individual prediction strategies
From inspection of Table 1 it is clear that only a relatively small part
(ranging from 12% in group 9 to 38% in group 3) of the average quadratic
forecasting error (ﬁrst column) can be explained by the dispersion in expec-
tations (second column). In fact, on average 75% of the average quadratic
forecast error can be attributed to the average common error. This conﬁrms
our conjecture that there is coordination on a common prediction strategy.
The observation that a relatively large part of the average quadratic fore-
cast error is due to the diﬀerence between the average expectation and the
realized price (third column) implies that “rational expectations with error”
is not a good description of participants’ expectation formation. In fact, it
suggests that participants’ mistakes are correlated. We therefore conclude
that participants make signiﬁcant forecasting errors, but they are alike in the
way that they make these forecasting errors.
5.2 Earnings
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 3 suggests that the participants are per-
forming quite well. Indeed, earnings from predicting can be substantial. The
total number of points they receive when always making the correct predic-
tion is 66300 and under rational expectations earnings would be 65975.I n
4For group 3, we have excluded the observation at time t =4 2 , where one of the
participants appeared to make a typing error (see footnote 4), which has a big impact on
these measures. If we include this observation we get 15.70, 11.10 and 4.60, respectively.
20the experiment participants earn on average 46939 points. Participants in
groups 4 and 10 earn a relatively small amount (20683 and 24470 respec-
tively, on average), whereas participants in groups 2 and 5 on average make
substantial earnings, close to the maximum (64168 and 63739 respectively).
The other groups are somewhere in between. The prices in groups 2 and 5
are not equal to the fundamental price (the only rational expectations price)
but the earnings in these groups are almost as high as earnings of rational
forecasters. In this sense the behavior of these subjects can be considered
as ‘close’ to rational. To some extent the same can be said about the other
groups with the exception of groups 4 and 10. These last groups show a
relatively high price volatility.
5.3 Informational eﬃciency
The analysis of Table 1 suggests that participants make structural forecast
errors. However, if participants are rational their forecast error should be
unbiased and uncorrelated with available information. To test whether par-
ticipants are rational in this sense we considered the time series of the forecast
errors pt − pe
ht, where we only used the last 41 observations. The sample av-
erage of these individual forecast errors is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at
the 5% level, for only 8 of the 60 participants. This means that for more
than 85% of the individuals forecast errors are unbiased. Furthermore, we
computed, for each participant, the ﬁrst 10 lags of the autocorrelation func-
tion of the time series of forecast errors. The signiﬁcant lags are presented
in Table 2.
part. 1 part. 2 part. 3 part. 4 part. 5 part. 6
1 1-3-4-5-7-8 1-3-4-7-8 1-3-4-5 1-3-4-5-7-8 1-3-4-7-8 1-3-4-5-7-8
2 1-2 — 1 1 1 2
3 — — 1 1-2 1 1
4 1-3-4 1-3-4 1-3-6 1-3-4-6 1-3-4 1-3-8
5 1 2 — — 2 1-8
6 1-4-5-6-9-10 1-4-5-6-9-10 1-4-5-6-10 1-4-5-10 1-4-5-6-9-10 1-4-5-6-9-10
7 1 1-2-3 1-2-3-8 1-3-4-8 1-2-3 1-3-4-8
8 1-4-5 1-2-4-5-6-7-8 1-4-5-6-7 1-4-5-6-7 1-4-5-6-7 1-4-5-6-7
9 1-2-5-6-7-8-9 1-2-5-6-7-8-9 1-2-5-6-7 1-5-6 1-5-6-7 1-2-5-6-7-8-9
10 1-4 1-3-4 1-3-4-5 1-3 1-3-4 1-3-4
Table 2: Autocorrelation structure in individual forecast errors. This table
presents all signiﬁcant lags at the 5% level.
Notice that the autocorrelation function of the forecast errors is signif-
21i c a n ta tt h eﬁrst lag for many participants. However, participants do not
have pt in their information set, when predicting pt+1. Hence, they are not
able to exploit the ﬁrst order autocorrelation structure in the forecast errors
to improve their predictions. Therefore one should ignore the signiﬁcant ﬁrst
order lags and focus on higher order lags of the autocorrelation function. We
thus ﬁnd that for about one fourth of the participants there is no exploitable
(linear) structure in the forecast errors at all. Ignoring the ﬁrst lag, we note
that the second lag is only signiﬁcant for 13 out of the 60 participants. Stated
diﬀerently, the most easily detected linear structure has been exploited eﬃ-
ciently by 47 participants. In this sense individual forecasts of about 80% of
all participants may be viewed as boundedly rational. Notice that most struc-
ture in the forecast errors can be found in the groups where the realized price
oscillates around the fundamental price. Furthermore, there is much simi-
larity between the autocorrelation structure of participants within a group,
again indicating that participants in the same group seem to coordinate on
a common prediction strategy.
5.4 Characterizing individual prediction strategies
We will now try to characterize and estimate the individual prediction strate-
gies. Some participants try to extrapolate certain trends and by doing so
overreact and predict too high or too low. Other participants are more cau-
tious when submitting predictions. When prices are rising (declining) they
usually predict a price lower (higher) than the actual price. Examples of the
latter are participant 1 in group 2,p a r t i c i p a n t6 in group 6 and participant
4 in group 7 in Figure 6.(a)-(c). Figure 6.(d)-(f) shows three examples of
trend extrapolators, participant 3 in group 4,p a r t i c i p a n t2 in group 6 and
participant 3 in group 7. These prediction strategies exhibit an overreaction
of predictions with respect to trends or changes in prices.
The individual degree of overreaction can be quantiﬁed as follows. Fig-
ure 7 shows, for each group, the average absolute (one-period) change in
















The average absolute change in the price, 4 = 1
41
P51
t=11 |pt − pt−1| is rep-
resented by the straight line. We will say that individual h overreacts if
4e
h > 4 and we will say that individual h is cautious if 4e
h ≤ 4.
Figure 7 measures the degree of overreaction. For a vast majority of
participants in groups 1, 3, 4 and 6−10 the individual degrees of overreaction





























Figure 6: Predictions and realized prices. Solid lines correspond to individual
predictions, dashed lines correspond to realized price. Upper left panel: par-
ticipant 1 in group 2, upper right panel: participant 6 in group 6, middle left
panel: participant 4 in group 7, middle right panel: participant 3 in group 4,
lower left panel: participant 2 in group 6 and lower right panel: participant
3 in group 7.
are higher than the changes in the realized prices. Oscillatory behavior is
thus caused by overreaction of a majority of agents. In groups 2 and 5 the
changes in predictions are similar to the changes in prices. Convergence to
the fundamental price occurs when a majority of traders is ‘cautious’.
The ﬁnal step in our analysis of the individual prediction strategies is to
try to estimate simple forecasting rules. The prediction strategies of all 60
participants can be described by the following general simple linear model
p
e








ht−j + νt,( 6 )
where νt is an independently and identically distributed noise term. No-
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Figure 7: Average absolute changes in predictions and prices. The horizontal
line for each group corresponds to average absolute price change 4,a n dt h e
dots correspond to the average absolute price forecast 4e
h for the diﬀerent
participants.
naive expectations (βh1 =1 ,a l lo t h e rc o e ﬃcients equal to 0); ii) adaptive
expectations (βh1+γh0 =1 ,a l lo t h e rc o e ﬃcients equal to 0)a n diii) AR(L)
processes (all coeﬃcients equal to 0,e x c e p tαh, βh1,...,βhL). We estimated
(6) for all 60 participants, using observations from t =1 1to t =5 1 .T h e
estimation results can be found in Tables 4, 5 and 6 in Appendix A.T h e s e
results are qualitatively summarized in Table 3.
Here B (k,l) refers to a prediction strategy where k is the highest sig-
niﬁcant lag of the price and l is the highest signiﬁcant lag of the prediction
(which does not necessarily mean that all smaller lags are also signiﬁcant)
in the regression. We ﬁnd 9 participants with AR(1) beliefs (of which 3
participants use naive expectations), 29 participants with AR(2) beliefs, 3
participants with AR(3) beliefs and 3 participants with adaptive beliefs.5
The remaining 16 participants use more complicated prediction rules. No-
tice that the AR(1) and adaptive rules are all found in groups 2, 3 and 5,
and the AR(2) and AR(3) rules are all found in the other groups. This is
consistent with the ﬁnding that in groups 2 and 5 the price seems to converge
5We arrive at the naive and adaptive expectations strategies in the following way.
For the AR(1) processes we tested the joint hypothesis αh =0and βh1 =1(naive
expectations). For processes where only the coeﬃcients on pt−1 and pe
ht are signiﬁcant we
tested the joint hypothesis αh =0and βh1 + γh0 =1(adaptive expectations).
24AR(1) (Naive) AR(2) AR(3) Adaptive Other
group 1 0 5 0 0 B (4,2)
group 2 4(3) 0 0 1 B (1,2)
group 3 2 3 0 1 —
group 4 0 3 1 0 B (3,1), B (4,3)
group 5 3 1 0 1 B (2,1)
group 6 0 5 0 0 B (2,2)
group 7 0 4 1 0 B (1,2)
group 8 0 4 0 0 B (1,1),B(4,3)
group 9 0 2 0 0 B (1,1), B (2,2),
B (2,3), B (4,1)
group 10 0 2 1 0 2 × B (1,1),B(3,0)
total 9 29 3 3 16
Table 3: Estimation results for individual prediction strategies
monotonically and that in groups 1, 4,a n d6−10 the price oscillates around
some steady state. Group 3 takes a somewhat special position, starting out
with oscillations and ending with monotonic convergence to the fundamental
price. Prediction strategies within groups are more similar than strategies
between groups which is consistent with the ﬁnding that participants within
one group seem to coordinate on a common prediction strategy.
The AR(2) prediction strategy can be rewritten as a trend following rule
p
e
h,t+1 = αh + βhpt−1 + δh (pt−1 − pt−2),
where βh ≡ βh1 + βh2 and δh ≡− βh2. For all of the 26 AR(2) prediction
strategies in the “oscillating” groups (1, 4, 6 − 10)w eh a v eb βh1 > 0 and
b βh2 < 0. The latter inequality is equivalent with δh > 0, which implies
that all these participants try to follow the trend: they expect that a recent
upward (or downward) movement in prices will continue in the near future.
These participants therefore correspond to so-called positive feedback traders.
Another interesting feature is that for the estimated AR(2) strategies in the
(oscillating) groups the variation in b βh1 + b βh2 seems to be lower than the
variation in b βh2. This suggest that participants within a group have the
same value of βh = βh1+βh2 but have diﬀe r e n tv a l u e so ft h et r e n dc o e ﬃcient
δ. We tested this hypothesis for the 5 relevant groups. Only for groups 1, 4
and 9 we cannot reject the hypothesis that βh = βh1 + βh2 i st h es a m ef o r
all relevant h.
In order to characterize the diﬀerent estimated prediction strategies, we
can determine, for each of them, what happens if all participants in a group
25use that estimated prediction strategy. Recall that in this experiment, even
if all participants use linear prediction rules, the asset price dynamics will be
a nonlinear dynamical system because the weight nt of the fundamentalist
traders changes over time. We ﬁnd that 10 of the estimated AR(2) prediction
strategies (3 in group 1, 1 in group 4, 3 in group 6, 1 in group 7 and 2 in group
8) are locally unstable and lead to persistent oscillations in the asset prices,
if used by all participants in a group.6 Two of the AR(1) rules (1 in group
2 and 1 in group 3) are stable but lead to a very diﬀerent steady state price
when used by all participants in a group.7 Moreover, if these AR(1) rules
are used by all participants in a group without fundamentalist traders and
without an upper limit on predictions and asset prices, exploding bubbles
emerge. For the more complicated non-AR(2) rules used by the participants
in groups 8, 9 and 10, we can say the following. The estimated prediction
strategies of participants 2 and 4 in group 8 are unstable (in the sense that
they would lead to bounded oscillations if all six participants used this rule).
For group 9 each of the estimated prediction strategies of participants 3, 5
and 6 give rise to unstable dynamics, when used by the whole population.
Finally, for group 10 the estimated prediction strategies of participants 3, 4
and 5 are unstable.
The estimated rules can also be used to get some insight in the following
questions: what happens i) in the long run; ii) in the absence of funda-
mentalist traders. In order to investigate these issues we did the following
numerical simulations. For each group the estimated individual prediction
strategies were programmed and the experiment was ran with these pro-
grammed prediction strategies. First this numerical simulation was ran for
more than 50 periods to investigate long run behavior. For the ﬁrst seven
groups we ﬁnd that realized asset prices stabilize close to the fundamental
value. For groups 8, 9 and 10, however, we ﬁnd perpetual but bounded ﬂuc-
tuations of the realized asset prices. Secondly, we investigated what would
happen in the absence of fundamentalist traders. Also here we found, for the
ﬁrst seven groups, convergence to a steady state close to the fundamental
price. On the other hand, for groups 8 and 9 realized prices will explode
in the absence of fundamentalist traders (and in the absence of an upper
bound on asset prices). Finally, for group 10 the simulations show bounded
oscillations in the absence of fundamentalist traders. Of course, analyses like
t h e s eh a v et ob ec o n s i d e r e dw i t hc a r e ,s i n c ew eu s et h ee s t i m a t e dp r e d i c t i o n
strategies in a context which is diﬀerent from the context where they were
6Recall from Section 3 that an AR(2) rule is locally unstable and leads to oscillating
behavior when β
2
1 +4 Rβ2 < 0 and β2 < −R.
7Recall from Section 3 that an AR(1) rule is locally unstable when β1 >R .
26used by the participants.
One ﬁnal remark is in order. From the estimation results we should
not draw the conclusion that these prediction strategies are typical for the
diﬀerent individuals, in the sense that these individuals will use the same rule
in another context as well. Actually, participants coordinate on some kind of
behavior and this behavior becomes self-fulﬁlling: the estimated relationships
are consistent with that behavior.
5.5 The impact of the fundamentalist traders
In this subsection we discuss the inﬂuence of the fundamentalist traders. We
ran four additional groups, where the only diﬀerence with the other sessions
is that there are no fundamentalist traders (nt =0 , for all t, in equation (1)).
Figure 8 shows the realized asset prices and individual predictions per group.
This ﬁg u r es h o w st h a ta l s oi nt h ec a s ew i t h o u tf u n d a m e n t a l i s tt r a d e r sc o o r -
dination of individual forecasting strategies on a common prediction strategy
occurs.
A total of 24 subjects participated in this session and their average earn-
ings were 32664 points (17.56 Euro), which is below the average earnings of
the ten other groups. For the four additional groups, the sample average of
realized prices was 56.48, so that also in these groups the market is underval-
ued. The sample variance of realized prices is quite large, especially in groups
11—13 (647 on average). Hence, in accordance with what one would expect,
without computerized fundamentalist traders market volatility is somewhat
higher than in the presence of fundamentalist traders.
Figure 8 also shows that in three of the four groups temporary bub-
bles and crashes occur. The fourth group shows a steady oscillation around
the fundamental value of pf =6 0 . These results are similar to those from a
related asset pricing experiment without fundamentalist traders, recently ob-
tained in Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra and van de Velden (2002), which we
discuss here brieﬂy. The main diﬀerence in these experiments is that partici-
pants have no a priori information about an upperbound on their prediction.
The most striking feature of these experiments is that bubbles increasing up
to a value of 1000 (i.e. more than 15 times the fundamental price) occur.8
Therefore, in these experiments without fundamentalist traders and without
8A priori no information about an upperbound for the asset price or the price forecast
was given to the participants. However, when asset prices increase and an individual
forecast larger than 1000 was given, the participant was informed that forecasts larger
than 1000 were not allowed, and was asked for a forecast not exceeding 1000.T h i sn e w
information lead to subsequent crashes in asset prices, followed by subsequent bubbles and











































Figure 8: Realized prices (left side graphs) and predictions (right side graphs)
for session without fundamentalist traders. Straight line at p =6 0corre-
sponds to fundamental price.
28an a priori given upperbound, participants coordinate on a common predic-
tion strategy, predicting (exponentially) growing asset prices (more details,
including regression results, on this session can be found in Appendix B).
From Figure 8 it is clear that also in the additional groups without funda-
mentalist traders, participants coordinate on a common prediction strategy.
Computations similar to those in subsection 5.1 show that 75% of the average
individual quadratic forecast error can be attributed to the common error.
Estimating individual forecasting strategies, as in subsection 5.4, shows that
the majority of the individual prediction strategies can be classiﬁed as AR(2),
AR(3) or AR(4) strategies. These results are similar to the results obtained
for the oscillatory groups 1, 4, 6 − 10 with fundamentalist trader.
In summary, also in the absence of the fundamentalist traders our key
ﬁnding remains that there is coordination on a common prediction strategy.
This coordination of expectations therefore seems to be a robust result in
these asset pricing experiments.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we investigated expectation formation in a simple experimental
asset pricing model. Ten markets are populated by six participants and a cer-
tain fraction of computerized fundamentalist traders; four additional markets
without computerized fundamentalist traders have also been investigated.
We observe slow and monotonic convergence to the fundamental price, as
well as regular oscillations around the fundamental price. In most groups
the asset is undervalued and exhibits excess volatility. Simple expectation
schemes (or popular models (Shiller (1990))) such as naive or autoregressive
expectations give a much better description of aggregate market behavior
than do rational expectations. From the analysis of the individual prediction
strategies we ﬁnd that participants within a group coordinate on a common
prediction strategy. Moreover, these popular models can be estimated rather
accurately, and this reveals that participants indeed tend to use simple (lin-
ear) forecasting models. In the stable markets, a majority of participants
is cautious and uses naive, adaptive or AR(1) forecasting strategies. In the
oscillatory groups, a majority of participants exhibits overreaction and uses
trend following strategies. Although the participants are not completely ra-
tional like standard economic theories assume, they perform very well. For
a large majority of individuals, forecasting errors are unbiased and with-
out autocorrelation in the smallest exploitable lag (lag 2) and their earnings
are high. Our experimental outcomes thus support the common hypothesis
in behavioral ﬁnance that individuals use simple, but reasonably successful,
29rules of thumb.
One may ask whether our experimental results can also be explained by
a rational theory. In fact, it has been pointed out recently, e.g. in Brav and
Heaton (2002, p.575), that it is diﬃcult to distinguish between “behavioral
theories built on investor irrationality and rational structural uncertainty
theories built on incomplete information about the structure of the economic
environment”. In particular, Brav and Heaton (2002) consider a model with
a one-period risky asset paying an uncertain dividend at the end of the pe-
riod. They compare the model with a rational agent who does not know
the true underlying generating process for dividends, but behaves rationally
given his incomplete information about economic fundamentals, to the model
with an irrational, behavioral investor, who knows the true underlying div-
idend process, but behaves according to a representativeness heuristic or
conservatism. They then show that both the rational agent model and the
behavioral model can generate a form of overreaction and underreaction in
asset prices. In other recent work, rational explanations of momentum trad-
ing have been proposed e.g. by Johnson (2002) in a rational model with
time-varying expected divididend growth rates and by Chordia and Shivaku-
mar (2002) in a rational model with time-varying expected returns due to
macroeconomic eﬀects. Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that the proﬁtability
of momentum strategies could be entirely due to cross-sectional variations in
expected returns; see also Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) for a discussion.
Laboratory experiments are well suited to distinguish rational and be-
havioral theories, because the experimenter can control the “economic fun-
damentals” as well as the information about these fundamentals. In our
experiments economic fundamentals are stationary, and participants know
the mean of the dividend process and the risk free interest rate, and can use
these to compute the constant fundamental price. Clearly this is not what
participants did in the experiments. In an unknown stationary environment
a rational agent would use the sample average as his price forecast, and this
would lead to slow convergence to the fundamental price. Again, this is
not what happened in the experiment. The slowly, monotonically converg-
ing groups 2 and 5 may perhaps be explained by rational Bayesian learning
with appropriate weight given to some prior beliefs, but this can not explain
the remaining oscillatory groups. A rational explanation of the oscillatory
groups could perhaps be that individuals (wrongly) believe that economic
fundamentals (dividends) are time-varying and act rationally given their be-
lief. Although in theory such a “rational” explanation is possible, it seems
unlikely that six individuals in a group coordinate on the same (wrong) belief
about market fundamentals, not supported by any observations of dividends
during the experiment, and act rationally on it. In contrast, the behavioral
30theories of naive expectations, low order linear forecasting rules and trend
following rules, have been estimated from observable quantities, and these
parsimonious rules ﬁt our experimental data surprisingly well. We therefore
view our experimental results as evidence for behavioral theories.
Let us ﬁnally try to develop some intuition for the emergence of expecta-
tional coordination. Participants in these experiments have an incentive to
coordinate their prediction strategies, since the market clearing price is close
to the average prediction. Participants who succeed in predicting the average
prediction well, perform well in the experiment. This feature of the asset pric-
ing experiment may be similar to real asset markets, and is consistent with
the ideas of Keynes (1936, p.156) who, in a much quoted passage, compared
behavior of traders in ﬁnancial markets to so-called beauty contests:
“[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions
in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole;
so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself ﬁnds
prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other
competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of
view. .... [W]e devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion
expects the average opinion to be.”
From our experiments we ﬁnd that participants are rather successful in
“anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be”.
If there are forces towards coordination of individual expectations, the
question then is what kind of ‘average’ equilibrium outcome will individuals
coordinate on? One possibility would be coordination on the fundamental
price, but in our experiments (slow) convergence to the fundamental price
only happens in a minority of cases. From a theoretical perspective another
possibility for coordination is a (rational) self-fulﬁlling bubble solution grow-
ing at the risk free interest rate. In the absence of a robot trader and in
the absence of upper- and lower bounds, these bubble solutions are rational
expectations (perfect foresight) equilibria. The presence of a robot trader,
who acts as a stabilizer in the direction of the fundamental price, makes
coordination on these bubble solutions less likely. In the experiment how-
ever, coordination on temporary bubbles, triggered by simple trend following
strategies, does occur even in the presence of computerized fundamentalist
traders. These trends are triggered by overreaction of a majority of par-
ticipants, and once triggered become self-fulﬁlling and lead to momentum
persisting. However, the trends cannot continue forever and are reversed,
31due to the lower and upper bounds 0 and 100 and/or the presence of robot
traders. The upward trend reverses and once reversed, trend extrapolating
forecasting rules reinforce the downward trend. The result is then coordi-
nation of individual expectations on damped or permanent oscillatory price
ﬂuctuations with upward and downward trends, as observed in most of our
groups. Our experiments thus provide evidence for a number of behavioral
modes popular in behavioral ﬁnance, in particular correlated imperfect ra-
tional forecasting due to trend extrapolation, overreaction and momentum
trading. Our experiments suggest that estimating a behavioral model, with
agents using simple strategies, on real ﬁnancial data is an important challenge
for future work.
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35A Individual prediction strategies
group 1 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
part. 1 26.83 1.58 -1.05 0.83
part. 2 18.42 1.22 -0.55 0.79
part. 3 28.43 1.55 -1.05 0.81
part. 4 29.24 1.22 -0.72 0.84
part. 5 34.35 1.61 -1.23 0.77
part. 6 20.53 1.94 -2.24 1.88 -0.71 0.48 -0.60 0.95
group 2 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
part. 1 -2.59∗ 0.27 0.78 0.98
part. 2 -1.08∗ 1.02 0.88
part. 3 -6.38 1.11 0.92
part. 4 3.76 0.91 0.32 0.21 0.97
part. 5a) 1 1
part. 6 7.22∗ 0.87 0.77
group 3 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
part. 1b) 13.74 0.74 0.85
part. 2 -32.49 1.60 0.68
part. 3 0.25∗ 1.82 -0.83 0.94
part. 4 2.25∗ 0.24 0.71 0.81
part. 5 10.60 1.20 -0.41 0.88
part. 6 10.97 1.30 -0.51 0.85
group 4 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
part. 1 10.26∗ 1.28 -1.96 0.84 0.63 0.79
part. 2 4.36∗ 2.14 -3.27 3.08 -1.31 0.90 -1.45 0.84 0.80
part. 3 13.87 1.85 -1.10 0.82
part. 4 15.76 1.65 -0.89 0.85
part. 5 1.87∗ 1.86 -1.49 0.54 0.70
part. 6 16.82 1.38 -0.70 0.57
Table 4: Estimated individual prediction strategies for groups 1 to 4
This appendix contains the estimated individual prediction strategies for













This was estimated on data from the experiment from t =1 1to t =5 1 .
The ﬁrst 10 periods are neglected in order to allow for some coordination or
36learning. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the estimation results. The constant term
is always part of the regression although sometimes it is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0. These cases are indicated with a ∗.W e t r i e d t o ﬁtt h e
simplest model, provided that there is no serial correlation in the residuals
at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
group 5 α β1 β2 β3 γ0 γ1 R2
part. 1 1.36∗ 0.49 0.48 0.80
part. 2 11.32 0.80 0.79
part. 3 7.18 0.87 0.88
part. 4 2.00∗ 0.63 0.33 0.93
part. 5 12.08 0.79 0.75
part. 6 2.97∗ 0.79 -0.41 0.57 0.83
group 6 α β1 β2 β3 γ0 γ1 R2
part. 1 3.17∗ 1.36 -0.41 0.96
part. 2 -9.60 2.48 -0.80 -0.52 0.96
part. 3 12.83 1.85 -1.06 0.90
part. 4 32.53 2.05 -1.60 0.93
part. 5 6.70 1.94 -1.06 0.97
part. 6 21.43 1.32 -0.69 0.95
group 7 α β1 β2 β3 γ0 γ1
part. 1 41.77 0.85 -0.55 0.45
part. 2 41.54 0.99 -0.68 0.66
part. 3 11.08∗ 2.11 -1.31 0.84
part. 4 61.71 0.67 -0.72 0.47
part. 5 28.52 1.77 -1.82 0.56 0.67
part. 6 30.08 1.47 -1.00 0.71
Table 5: Estimated individual prediction strategies for groups 5 to 7
Some remarks:
1. The estimates indicated by a ∗ are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at
the 5% level.
2. Group 2: for participant 1 the null hypothesis of adaptive expectations,
H0 :( α =0and β1 + γ0 =1 ) , cannot be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance
level; for participants 2 and 6 the null hypothesis of naive expectations,
H0 :( α =0 ,β 1 =1 )cannot be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level, for
participant 3 this hypothesis is rejected. a)For the sample considered
participant 5 exactly uses naive expectations.
3. Group 3: for participant 4 the null hypothesis of adaptive expecta-
tions, H0 :( α =0 ,β 1 + γ0 =1 )cannot be rejected. b)Participant 1
37group 8 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
part. 1 11.35 2.32 -1.59 0.95
part. 2 0.42∗ 1.24 1.78 -1.03 -0.98 0.90
part. 3 8.46 1.97 -1.15 0.92
part. 4 -4.20∗ 2.32 -1.21 0.94
part. 5 1.44∗ 1.91 -0.93 0.95
part. 6 4.10∗ 1.71 -0.81 0.89
group 9 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
part. 1 4.08 0.81 0.87 -0.78 0.97
part. 2 4.89 1.52 -0.63 0.98
part. 3 7.88 2.63 -3.05 -1.59 1.32 1.49 0.98
part. 4 2.97∗ 1.92 -0.99 0.97
part. 5 3.29∗ 2.01 -2.06 2.23 -1.00 0.61 -0.87 0.99
part. 6 -3.06∗ 2.77 -1.12 -1.21 0.64 0.97
group 10 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
part. 1 9.29∗ 1.73 -0.97 0.70
part. 2 0.29∗ 1.58 -0.58 0.92
part. 3 -16.10 3.92 -2.52 1.20 -1.15 0.92
part. 4 7.74∗ 2.28 -1.41 0.83
part. 5 3.59∗ 2.61 -2.64 1.02 0.87
part. 6 13.45 1.56 -0.82 0.87
Table 6: Estimated individual prediction strategies for groups 8 to 10
s u b m i t t e da ne x p e c t a t i o no f5.25 in period 42, where we have a strong
belief that he planned to submit 55.25. We therefore replaced the 42’th
observation on this participant by 55.25. We also estimated the indi-
vidual prediction strategies in this group using only data from period
t =1 1to period t =4 0 .W e t h e n ﬁnd very similar results, namely
one adaptive prediction strategy, one AR(1) strategy and three AR(2)
strategies. The individual prediction strategy of participant 5 is a little
more complicated in that case, since he uses the ﬁrst two prices and
the fourth lag of his own previous expectations (his prediction strategy
can therefore be described by B (2,3)).
4. Group 5: for participant 1 the null hypothesis that this participant
averages over the last two prices, H0 :
¡




rejected; for participant 4 the null hypothesis of adaptive expectations
cannot be rejected.
5. Group 10: for participant 2 the null hypothesis H0 :( α =0 ,β1 + β2 =1 )
cannot be rejected.
386. For all groups with AR(2) strategies we ﬁnd that for the estimated
AR(2) strategies the variation in b βh1 + b βh2 is much smaller than the




h,t+1 = αh + βhpt−1 + δh (pt−1 − pt−2),
where βh ≡ βh1 + βh2 and δh ≡− βh2. Our hypothesis now is that
βh (and possibly αh) is the same for all participants in a group and
δh diﬀers across participants in a group. We tested this hypothesis in
all groups where the AR(2) prediction strategy emerges. We cannot
reject the hypothesis at a 5% level for the AR(2) prediction strategies
in groups 1, 4 and 9. The results are given in Table 7.
α β δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6
group 1 — 0.52 1.06 0.62 1.04 0.71 1.17 —
group 4 15.48 0.74 — — 1.11 0.90 — 0.36
group 9 3.93 0.91 — 0.61 — 1.01 — —
Table 7: Test for homogeneous positive feedback expectations
For group 1 we have no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in βh1 + βh2, for group 4
we have no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in αh and in βh1 + βh2 and for group 9 we
have no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in αh and in βh1+βh2. In all other groups the
hypothesis is rejected.
39B Results for session without fundamentalist
traders
In this appendix we brieﬂy present some quantitative results on the extra
session without fundamentalist traders, which was described in Section 5.5.
Average earnings in these four groups were 32664 points. The sample mean





group 11 54.79 807.27
group 12 56.09 544.15
group 13 56.37 588.41
group 14 58.67 20.75
Table 8: Sample mean and sample average of realized price
The next table quantiﬁes the coordination on a common prediction strat-
egy.


















11 431.20 68.47 (16%) 362.74 (84%)
12 391.00 67.42 (17%) 323.58 (83%)
13 453.90 132.32 (29%) 321.59 (71%)
14 2.01 0.76 (38%) 1.25 (62%)
Table 9: Measures for individual prediction strategies
Again the largest part of the forecast error can be attributed to the aver-
age common error (on average 75%). We also estimated individual prediction
strategies. The estimated relationships have the following general structure
p
e









This was estimated on data from the experiment from t =1 1to t =5 1 .
The ﬁrst 10 periods are neglected in order to allow for some coordination
or learning. Table 10 presents the estimation results. The constant term
40is always part of the regression although sometimes it is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0. These cases are indicated with a ∗.W e t r i e d t o ﬁtt h e
simplest model, so that there is no serial correlation in the residuals at the
5% signiﬁcance level.
group 11 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 R2
part. 1 10.02 3.29 -1.07 -1.41 0.89
part. 2 14.59 1.71 -1.01 0.82
part. 3 8.40∗ 0.57 1.72 -1.48 0.88
part. 4 3.14∗ 1.72 -1.30 0.50 0.90
part. 5 8.39 1.63 -0.77 0.92
part. 6 12.98 1.60 -0.84 0.80
group 12 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 R2
part. 1 17.99 1.61 -0.94 0.81
part. 2 17.58 0.54 0.77 -0.63 0.77
part. 3 17.95 1.31 -0.61 0.74
part. 4 6.81∗ 1.53 -1.16 0.48 0.80
part. 5 26.04 1.58 -1.90 1.58 -0.74 0.60
part. 6 11.15∗ 1.75 -1.57 0.63 0.81
group 13 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 R2
part. 1 17.43 1.79 -1.04 0.71
part. 2 9.74 1.41 -0.56 0.88
part. 3 22.54 0.47 0.66 -0.62 0.56
part. 4 21.53 1.34 -0.67 0.75
part. 5 17.47 1.56 -0.88 0.74
part. 6 8.14 1.57 -0.72 0.92
group 14 α β1 β2 β3 β4 γ0 γ1 R2
part. 1 -4.98 1.73 -0.65 0.98
part. 2 -1.37∗ 1.77 -0.74 0.99
part. 3 1.63∗ 1.80 -0.83 0.98
part. 4 3.33∗ 2.10 -1.15 0.82
part. 5 2.67∗ 1.80 -1.23 0.38 0.97
part. 6 1.06∗ 0.80 0.19 0.98
Table 10: Estimated individual prediction strategies for groups 11 to 14
Remarks:
1. The estimates indicated by a ∗ are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at
the 5% level.
2. Group 14: for participant 6 the null hypothesis of adaptive expectations
cannot be rejected.
41AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) Adaptive Other
group 11 0 3 1 0 B (2,0), B (2,1)
group 12 0 2 2 0 AR(4), B (1,1)
group 13 0 3 0 0 3 × B (1,1)
group 14 0 4 0 1 B (2,0)
total 0 12 3 1 8
Table 11: Estimation results for individual prediction strategies
The following table summarizes the results.
Note that in each group a majority of the agents uses an autoregressive
predictor. In fact, exactly two thirds of the prediction strategies can be
described by an AR(2), AR(3) or AR(4) rule.
42C Information for Participants
General information.
You are a ﬁnancial advisor to a pension fund that wants to optimally invest
a large amount of money. The pension fund has two investment options:
a risk free investment and a risky investment. The risk free investment
is putting all money on a bank account paying a ﬁxed interest rate. The
alternative risky investment is an investment in the stock market. In each
time period the pension fund has to decide which fraction of their money
to put on the bank account and which fraction of the money to spend on
buying stocks. In order to make an optimal investment decision the pension
fund needs an accurate prediction of the price of stocks. As their ﬁnancial
advisor, you have to predict the stock market price (in guilder) during 52
subsequent time periods. Your earnings during the experiment depend upon
your forecasting accuracy. The smaller your forecasting errors in each period,
the higher your total earnings.
Information about the stock market.
The stock market price is determined by equilibrium between demand and
supply of stocks. The supply of stocks is ﬁxed during the experiment. The
demand for stocks is mainly determined by the aggregate demand of a number
of large pension funds active in the stock market. Some of these pension funds
are advised by a participant to the experiment, others use a ﬁxed strategy.
There is also some uncertain, small demand for stocks by private investors
but the eﬀect of private investors upon the stock market equilibrium price
is small. The price of the stocks is determined by market equilibrium, that
is, the stock market price in period t will be the price for which aggregate
demand equals supply.
Information about the investment strategies of the pension funds.
The precise investment strategy of the pension fund that you are advising
and the investment strategies of the other pension funds are unknown. The
bank account of the risk free investment pays a ﬁxed interest rate of 5% per
time period. The holder of the stocks receives an uncertain dividend payment
in each time period. These dividend payments are uncertain however and
vary over time. Economic experts of the pension funds have computed that
the average dividend payments are 3 guilder per time period. The return of
the stock market per time period is uncertain and depends upon (unknown)
dividend payments as well as upon price changes of the stock. As the ﬁnancial
advisor of a pension fund you are not asked to forecast dividends, but you are
only asked to forecast the price of the stock in each time period. Based upon
43your stock market price forecast, your pension fund will make an optimal
investment decision. The higher your price forecast the larger will be the
fraction of money invested by your pension fund in the stock market, so the
larger will be their demand for stocks.
Forecasting task of the ﬁnancial advisor.
The only task of the ﬁnancial advisors in this experiment is to forecast the
stock market price in each time period as accurately as possible. The price
of the stock will always be between 0 and 100 guilder. The stock price has to
be predicted two time periods ahead. At the beginning of the experiment,
you have to predict the stock price in the ﬁrst two periods, that is, you have
to give predictions for time periods 1 and 2. After all participants have given
their predictions for the ﬁrst two periods, the stock market price in the ﬁrst
period will be revealed and based upon your forecasting error your earnings
for period 1 will be given. After that you have to give your prediction for
the stock market index in the third period. After all participants have given
their predictions for period 3, the stock market price in the second period will
be revealed and, based upon your forecasting error your earnings for period
2 will be given. This process continues for 52 time periods.
To forecast the stock price pt in period t, the available information thus
consists of
• past prices up to period t − 2,
• past predictions up to period t − 1,
• past earnings up to period t − 2
Earnings.
Earnings will depend upon forecasting accuracy only. The better you predict
the stock market price in each period, the higher your aggregate earnings.
Earnings will be according to the following earnings table.
44DP a y o ﬀ Table
Payoﬀ table
1300 points equal 1 guilder
error points error points error points error points error points
0.1 1300 1.5 1240 3 1061 4.4 786 5.8 408
0.15 1299 1.55 1236 3.05 1053 4.45 775 5.85 392
0.2 1299 1.6 1232 3.1 1045 4.5 763 5.9 376
0.25 1298 1.65 1228 3.15 1037 4.55 751 5.95 361
0.3 1298 1.7 1223 3.2 1028 4.6 739 63 4 5
0.35 1297 1.75 1219 3.25 1020 4.65 726 6.05 329
0.4 1296 1.8 1214 3.3 1011 4.7 714 6.1 313
0.45 1295 1.85 1209 3.35 1002 4.75 701 6.15 297
0.5 1293 1.9 1204 3.4 993 4.8 689 6.2 280
0.55 1292 1.95 1199 3.45 984 4.85 676 6.25 264
0.6 1290 2 1194 3.5 975 4.9 663 6.3 247
0.65 1289 2.05 1189 3.55 966 4.95 650 6.35 230
0.7 1287 2.1 1183 3.6 956 56 3 7 6.4 213
0.75 1285 2.15 1177 3.65 947 5.05 623 6.45 196
0.8 1283 2.2 1172 3.7 937 5.1 610 6.5 179
0.85 1281 2.25 1166 3.75 927 5.15 596 6.55 162
0.9 1279 2.3 1160 3.8 917 5.2 583 6.6 144
0.95 1276 2.35 1153 3.85 907 5.25 569 6.65 127
1 1273 2.4 1147 3.9 896 5.3 555 6.7 109
1.05 1271 2.45 1141 3.95 886 5.35 541 6.75 91
1.1 1268 2.6 1121 48 7 6 5.4 526 6.8 73
1.15 1265 2.65 1114 4.05 865 5.45 512 6.85 55
1.2 1262 2.7 1107 4.1 854 5.5 497 6.9 37
1.25 1259 2.75 1099 4.15 843 5.55 483 6.95 19
1.3 1255 2.8 1092 4.2 832 5.6 468 error ≥ 70
1.35 1252 2.85 1085 4.25 821 5.65 453
1.4 1248 2.9 1077 4.3 809 5.7 438
1.45 1244 2.95 1069 4.35 798 5.75 423
45